A Random Walk Down Main Street: Can Experts Predict Returns on Commercial Real Estate? by David C. Ling
JRER  Vol. 27  No. 2 – 2005
A Random Walk Down Main Street: Can
Experts Predict Returns on Commercial
Real Estate?
Author David C. Ling
Abstract This study examines the ability of experts, speciﬁcally
institutional owners and managers, to predict commercial real
estate return performance in major metropolitan markets and on
various property types. The ﬁndings indicate that the consensus
opinions on investment conditions contained in Real Estate
Research Corporation’s quarterly Real Estate Investment Survey
are useful in forecasting subsequent return performance. In fact,
the ﬁndings document that RERC’s surveys are backward
looking. The implications of these ﬁndings for investors are
discussed.
The ability of investors and managers to predict stock prices has been debated for
more than 100 years. Bachelier (1900) argued that the probability at any moment
of a rise in the price of a publicly traded security is the same as the probability
of a fall in price, because ‘‘Clearly, the price considered most likely by the market
is the true current price: if the market judged otherwise, it would quote not this
price, but another price higher or lower.’’1 Under these conditions, Bachelier
argued that stock prices will move only when the market revises the ‘‘price
considered most likely.’’Over time, this characterization of stock price movements
came to be called the random walk or, more formally, the efﬁcient market
hypothesis. A primary focus of capital market research has been to determine
whether or not the random walk is an accurate description of stock price
movements (Bernstein, 1992).
A segment of this ‘‘predictability’’ literature has focused on the ability of security
analysts, portfolio managers, newspaper columnists, and other ‘‘experts’’to predict
returns. In the process of managing his family’s ﬁnancial affairs in the 1920s,
Alfred Cowles kept abreast of the stock market by subscribing to publication
services that provided investment advice. He came to view the volume of
publications coming his way as ‘‘a little wasteful’’ and decided to ascertain which
publication was best so that his subscriptions to the others could be canceled.
Cowles (1933) analyzed the track records of 24 forecasting publications. He
concluded that ‘‘the average forecasting agency fell [below] the average of all138  Ling
performances achievable by pure chance’’ and that, in all tests, the market as a
whole had outperformed the practitioners. In 1944, Cowles published a second
study in Econometrica that examined 6,904 expert forecasts over a 15-year period
(Cowles, 1944). Again, the results failed ‘‘to disclose evidence of ability to predict
successfully the future course of the stock market.’’
Paul Samuelson’s research also led him to take a dim view of portfolio managers.
Samuelson (1974) stated that ‘‘a respect for the evidence compels me to incline
toward the hypothesis that most portfolio managers should go out of business—
take up plumbing, teach Greek, or help produce the annual GDP by serving as
corporate executives.’’
Although the traditional formulation of the efﬁcient market hypothesis (EMH)
precludes predictable stock prices, theoretical advances in asset pricing and
behavioral ﬁnance theory have produced models that allow for the existence of
predictable prices and returns. Moreover, a growing empirical literature, aided by
the signiﬁcantly increased processing time of computers, has provided some
evidence that stock prices are predictable, to some extent, using publicly available
information (Keim, 1986; Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Xia, 2001; Avramov, 2002;
Doukas, 2002; Ogden, 2003; and Avramov, 2004) and that a sizable minority of
active mutual fund managers actually do pick stocks well enough to more than
cover their trading costs (Kallberg, Liu and Trzcinka, 2000; Wermers, 2003; and
Kosowski, Timmerman, White and Wermers, 2004). Nevertheless, attempts to
characterize stock return predictability have not produced a consistent set of
explanatory variables, giving rise to model uncertainty and data snooping fears
(Cremers, 2002).
What about the predictability of commercial real estate returns? Recent research
has produced some evidence that returns on exchange-traded real estate securities
are partially predictable (e.g., Liu and Mei, 1992; Mei and Liu, 1994; Cooper,
Downs and Patterson, 1995; Li and Wang, 1995; Karolyi and Sanders, 1998; Ling,
Naranjo and Ryngaert, 2000; and Brooks and Tsolacos, 2003). However, Ling et
al. ﬁnd no evidence that superior return performance using a market timing
strategy to buy and sell real estate securities is possible once transaction costs are
incorporated into the analysis.
Although evidence of an economically signiﬁcant return predictability does not
exist for securitized real estate markets, many analysts and investors have
concluded that skillful portfolio mangers can add value (on a risk-adjusted basis)
in the private real estate market through asset selection and investment timing
strategies.2 This conclusion is based on the widely held view that private
(unsecured) commercial real estate markets exhibit persistent inefﬁciencies that
can be exploited by superior investment managers. The purported inefﬁciencies in
private real estate markets are thought to arise from an absence of centralized
trading, or even price lists, a low degree of turnover in investor portfolios, a lack
of transparency in the transactions that do occur, and the heterogeneity and
indivisibility of commercial real estate assets.A Random Walk Down Main Street  139
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That many market participants believe real estate portfolio managers can add value
is evidenced by the dramatic growth of the commercial investment management
industry since the 1970s and by the recent proliferation of investment funds and
management strategies offered by the industry. These funds and strategies are
known by descriptive names such as ‘‘enhanced core,’’ ‘‘value added,’’ or
‘‘opportunistic,’’depending loosely on the magnitude of the excess returns targeted
by the fund (Stoesser and Hess, 2000). Typically, the excess returns expected to
be produced by these strategies are thought to arise from the manager’s ability to
successfully ‘‘target’’ geographical markets and/or property types, or at least that
is part of the marketing pitch provided to owners and investors by some investment
advisors to justify the collection of advisory fees.
Despite the proliferation of actively managed real estate funds and claims of
superior ‘‘targeting’’ability, evidence that real estate managers can pick ‘‘winners’’
and ‘‘losers’’ is largely nonexistent. This paper attempts to shed some light on the
ability of commercial real estate experts to successfully target property types and
geographic markets. In particular, we examine the ability of the respondents to
Real Estate Research Corporation’s quarterly Real Estate Investment Survey to
predict returns for nine property types and ﬁfteen to nineteen metropolitan markets
over a thirteen-year sample period. To examine RERC’s ability to predict return
performance on institutional quality property, in the spirit of Cowles (1933, 1944),
we collect the consensus opinions on investment conditions in sixteen
metropolitan areas and for nine property types from RERC’s quarterly Real Estate
Report. These forecasts are then compared to the actual returns earned by
institutional investors in these property types and metropolitan areas as measured
by the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF).
The results are not encouraging for those who have paid for and spent time
pouring over the prognostications of the experts. Using ten different quarterly
RERC surveys over the 1991 through 2000 time period, we ﬁnd no evidence that
the consensus opinions on investment conditions contained in RERC’s survey
results are useful in forecasting subsequent return performance. In fact, contrarian
investment strategies are at least as likely to produce superior returns as are the
investment strategies implied by the RERC survey results. Although we ﬁnd no
evidence that RERC’s survey results are helpful in targeting property types or
geographic markets, we do ﬁnd that their consensus predictions are correlated
with NCREIF returns in the two years prior to the survey. That is, RERC’s
investment conditions are clearly backward looking, not forward looking.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the research design
and data used to quantify the ability of RERC survey respondents to forecast
investment performance. The following section discusses the results. The
implications of our ﬁndings are discussed in a concluding section.
 Research Design and Data
Founded in 1931 in Chicago, Real Estate Research Corporation was one of the
ﬁrst national ﬁrms dedicated to commercial real estate research, valuation, and140  Ling
consulting services. Today, RERC is nationally known for its research, analysis,
and investment criteria.
Published quarterly in the Real Estate Report, the RERC Real Estate Investment
Survey summarizes the expected rates of return, property selection criteria, and
investment outlook of a sample of institutional investors and managers throughout
the United States. For example, the summer 2004 Real Estate Report contained
information collected from 151 survey respondents. Thirty-nine of these were
described as ‘‘national respondents,’’ while the remaining 112 were characterized
as ‘‘regional respondents.’’ The national respondents included individuals from
ﬁrms such as Bank of America, Prudential Real Estate Investors, RREEF,
Cushman & Wakeﬁeld, CB Richard Ellis, Legg Mason Realty Services, State
Teachers Retirement System of Ohio, and Russell Real Estate Advisors.
RERC Survey respondents provide information on current investment criteria such
as required (ex ante) internal rates of return, going-in and terminal capitalization
rates, tenant renewal probabilities, and investment conditions. The survey results
are collected, averaged, and published in the quarterly Real Estate Report, along
with RERC’s analysis of the results. According to RERC, the survey results are
used by investors, developers, appraisers, and ﬁnancial institutions to ‘‘monitor
changing market conditions and to forecast ﬁnancial performance.’’3
The focus here is on the results reported by RERC on current ‘‘investment
conditions.’’ Survey respondents are asked to rank the current investment
conditions of nine property types. These rankings are not MSA-speciﬁc; that is,
survey respondents rank the investment desirability of apartment investments,
suburban ofﬁce investments, along with seven other property types across the U.S.
RERC also publishes survey results for a signiﬁcant number of metropolitan areas.
These MSA-level investment condition rankings are not property speciﬁc. Survey
respondents are asked to rank current investment conditions in each MSA or for
each property type on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating ‘‘poor’’ investment
conditions and 10 indicating ‘‘excellent’’ conditions.
Exhibit 1 contains the property-level investment condition survey results for the
ﬁrst quarters of 2001 and 2002. In 2002, the consensus opinion was that apartment
properties, with a rank of 6.6, were the most desirable investments, followed by
neighborhood retail and industrial warehouse properties. In contrast, hotel
investments, with a mean ranking of 3.1, were deemed the least desirable of the
nine property types. Although not evident from the two sample quarters displayed
in Exhibit 1, RERC’s investment condition rankings display a signiﬁcant amount
of variation over time in both absolute and relative terms.
How do we assess the ability of RERC’s investment conditions to forecast
subsequent return performance? The most widely used total return indices of
privately-held, institutional-quality real estate returns are produced quarterly by
NCREIF. The NCREIF Property Index (NPI) is a property-level index that reportsA Random Walk Down Main Street  141
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Retail-regional mall 4.5 5.5
Retail-power center 3.9 3.6
Notes: The source is RERC Real Estate Report, Vol. 30, No.1 and Vol. 31, No. 1.
aRated on a scale of 1  poor to 10  excellent.
unleveraged, appraisal-based, total returns on a quarterly basis. NCREIF’s
members who own fully operational properties (at least 60% leased), make
quarterly reports to NCREIF regarding the values of all such properties, as well
as the net operating income, capital improvement expenditures, and partial sales
receipts associated with each property (along with other information primarily of
a property-descriptive nature). NCREIF computes the quarterly total return for
each property (net income plus change in market value), and then constructs the
index as the value-weighted average across all the constituent properties’ returns.
NCREIF reports total return at the aggregate U.S. level, as well as numerous sub-
indices deﬁned by property type and geographic location.4
How appropriate is the use of the NCREIF Index as a benchmark to measure the
forecasting ability of RERC survey respondents? According to Geltner and Ling
(2001), NCREIF’s data-contributing members represent over 70% of the property
holdings of the entire tax-exempt ﬁduciary branch of the investment industry.
Institutional ‘‘core’’ properties are precisely the segment of the market that is the
focus of the RERC survey.
A frequently noted shortcoming of the NCREIF Total Return Index is the way in
which changes in the values of the properties that comprise the index are
estimated. At least once a year, independent fee appraisals are obtained by owners
of all NCREIF properties. These appraisals are then updated in-house during the
intervening quarters. If a property in the Index happens to sell in a particular
quarter, only then is a transaction price used to calculate the property’s price142  Ling
appreciation or depreciation. Thus, the appreciation component of the total return
is largely estimated from changes in appraised values. The use of appraisals in
determining quarterly changes in property values is believed to ‘‘smooth’’
indicated changes in underlying property values.5 Appraisal smoothing can greatly
affect the analysis of questions relating to lag/led relationships and correlations
between private real estate and other asset classes and the quantiﬁcation of risk
measures, such as beta or volatility. However, return smoothing is not an issue
when measuring average total return performance over extended periods of time
such as the four- to ten-year holding periods considered here.
A ﬁnal consideration in this study’s use and interpretation of RERC’s investment
conditions is risk. If a survey respondent is asked whether or not it is a good time
to purchase, say, suburban ofﬁce buildings, a natural response is to ask ‘‘at what
price?’’ Although risk is not discussed in RERC’s description of its survey, it is
clear from the survey instructions and RERC’s interpretations of the results that
respondents are ranking the investment desirability of property types or
metropolitan areas given the current pricing they are observing for these property
types and metropolitan areas. If, for example, hotels are viewed to be more risky
than the other eight property types tracked by RERC, this risk is reﬂected in lower
market prices and higher expected returns (all else equal) for hotel investments.
Because risk, and its effects on pricing, are factored into the respondents’ ranking
of investment conditions, it is not necessary to risk-adjust the NCREIF returns
used to quantify subsequent return performance.
 Results
Correlation of Realized Returns with RERC Survey
Forecasts
To examine the ability of RERC’s panel of owners and managers to predict return
performance, realized NCREIF returns were ﬁrst correlated with the corresponding
raw RERC investment desirability rankings. An example of this methodology is
contained in Exhibit 2. The ﬁrst column displays the ranking of investment
conditions in the ﬁrst quarter of 1994 for the nine property types. At that time,
the consensus opinion of the survey respondents was that apartment properties
would perform the best, as indicated by the mean investment condition ranking
of 7.6. Apartment properties were expected to be followed in performance by
industrial warehouses and regional malls. With an average investment condition
ranking of 4.8, suburban ofﬁce properties were expected to underperform the
remaining eight properties types. Column 2 in Exhibit 2 contains the annualized
rates of return realized by each of the property types, as reported by NCREIF,
over the four-year period immediately following the ﬁrst quarter 1994 survey. For
example, apartment properties produced an average annualized total return ofA Random Walk Down Main Street  143
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Notes: The source is RERC Real Estate Report, Vol. 23, No. 1 and NCREIF.
aRated on a scale of 1  poor to 10  excellent.
11.7% over the 1994:2 through 1998:1 time period, while low-rated suburban
ofﬁce properties produced an average annual return of 13.0%. Exhibit 2 also
reveals that actual returns were negatively correlated with the RERC rankings; in
fact, the correlation for this combination of survey quarter and holding period
returns is 0.48.
Exhibit 3 contains the full set of correlations for the nine property types between
RERC rankings and actual returns. Because of the signiﬁcant transaction costs
associated with acquiring and disposing of direct ownership interests in
commercial real estate, average investment holding periods tend to be long. A
number of studies suggest that typical holding periods for institutional investors
range from eight to twelve years. To eliminate the potential sensitivity of the
results to the assumed investment holding period, results are reported for four, six,
eight, and ten-year holding periods.
The ﬁrst column in Exhibit 3 contains the correlations between RERC’s rankings
and the corresponding realized return over the subsequent four-year period. For
example, the correlation between the fourth quarter 1991 RERC rankings for the
nine property types and the corresponding NCREIF returns over the subsequent
four years is 0.34. For the nine RERC surveys for which total returns were
calculated in the subsequent four years, the average correlation between RERC’s
desirability rankings and actual return performance is 0.14. When the quarterly144  Ling
Exhibit 3  How Correlated are RERC Property Type Investment Conditions with Subsequent Return

















1991:4 0.34 0.26 0.38 0.28 0.14
1993:1 0.10 0.38 0.41 0.13 0.26
1994:1 0.48 0.55 0.45 0.10 0.39
1995:1 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.24
1996:1 0.64 0.70 0.16 0.50
1997:1 0.59 0.00 0.30
1998:1 0.11 0.70 0.29
1999:1 0.29 0.29
2000:1 0.03 0.03
Average 0.14 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.22
Note: The source is NCREIF and RERC Real Estate Report, various issues.
RERC investment condition rankings are compared to total returns over the
subsequent six years, the average correlation declines to 0.21; for eight-year
holding periods, the average correlation declines further to 0.27. The average
correlation for the twenty-four property type ‘‘cells’’ is 0.22. In short, there is
clearly no positive correlation between the predictions of RERC survey
respondents and the actual return performance of the nine property types.
Exhibit 4 contains the corresponding correlations for the nineteen metropolitan
areas.6 For example, the average correlation between the quarterly survey rankings
and the total return in the subsequent four years is 0.09. The average correlation
for each of the twenty MSA/holding period cells is 0.06, which is not statistically
different from zero. Again, there appears to be no correlation between the MSA-
level performance predictions of RERC survey respondents and actual return
performance, although the correlation of 0.62 between the investment desirability
ranking published in the ﬁrst quarter of 1997 and returns in the subsequent four
years is puzzling. The mean and standard deviation of the desirability rankings
across MSAs in 1997:1 are not signiﬁcantly different than for other survey
quarters. However, investment returns are random variables subject to an enormous
number of exogenous inﬂuences which are, in turn, random variables. Thus, this
seemingly high positive correlation is likely the result of random chance, although
we cannot rule out the possibility that survey respondents as a group were actually
good, not just lucky, when making their ﬁrst quarter 1997 predictions.A Random Walk Down Main Street  145
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Exhibit 4  How Correlated are RERC MSA Investment Conditions with Subsequent Return

















1991:4 0.09 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.06
1993:1 0.18 0.25 0.20 0.12 0.19
1994:1 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.06
1995:1 0.11 0.19 0.29 0.20
1996:1 0.03 0.05 0.04
1997:1 0.62 0.50 0.56
1998:1 0.09 0.08 0.00
1999:1 0.06 0.06
Average 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.06
Note: The source is NCREIF and RERC Real Estate Report, various issues.
The Effectiveness of Forming Portfolios based on RERC
Rankings
If RERC’s rankings of investment conditions are useful, pursuing a strategy of
investing in portfolios of highly ranked properties should, on average, dominant
a strategy of investing in portfolios of lowly ranked property types. To examine
this hypothesis, for each RERC survey in the sample, the median investment
desirability ranking is calculated for the nine property types and sixteen
metropolitan areas. Property types or MSAs with investment condition rankings
above the median are combined, in equal proportions, to form a highly ranked
portfolio, while property types or MSAs with rankings below the median
investment condition ranking are combined to form an equally-weighted low
ranked portfolio.
An example of this portfolio sorting strategy is contained in Exhibit 5. The ﬁrst
column lists eight property types in the order in which they were ranked in terms
of investment conditions in the ﬁrst quarter 1994 survey. The median ranking,
associated with neighborhood shopping centers, was 6.2. The four property types
with desirability rankings in excess of 6.2—apartments, industrial warehouses,
regional malls, and power centers—are combined to form the equally-weighted
highly ranked portfolio. The four property types with average rankings below 6.2
are combined to form the equally-weighted low ranked portfolio. The average146  Ling







Retail-regional mall 6.5 6.2







Difference in Portfolio Returns (HML) 4.3
Notes: The source is RERC Real Estate Report, Vol. 23, No. 1 and NCREIF.
aRated on a scale of 1  poor to 10  excellent. The mean ranking, associated with
neighborhood shopping centers, was 6.2.
return is then calculated on both the high- and low-ranked portfolios for the four
years immediately following the ﬁrst quarter of 1994. This produces total returns
of 10.1% and 14.2%, respectively, for the high- and low-ranked portfolios, a high
minus low (HML) difference of 4.3 percentage points (430 basis points).
Exhibit 6 contains the full set of HML portfolio return differentials for the nine
property types. Investors who formed portfolios based on the fourth quarter 1991
survey results would have experienced a 3.17 percentage point return differential
on the highly ranked portfolio relative to the low ranked portfolio. The average
return differential for a four-year holding period is 1.07 percentage points.
However, as assumed holding periods increase in length, the average HML return
differential quickly becomes negative, falling to 0.95 percentage points for six-
year holding periods and 1.12 percentage points for eight-year holding periods.
For ten-year holding periods, the return differential is 0.29 percentage points.
For the twenty-four combinations of RERC survey results and holding period
assumptions, the highly ranked portfolio underperformed low-ranked portfolios by
an average of 0.14 percentage points. Although this negative HML differential is
not statistically signiﬁcant, it is clear that portfolios of highly-ranked property
types did not outperform low-ranked portfolios. It is also important to note that
there was a great deal of variation in the HML differential across the 24 sample
cells. This variation is suggestive of a high degree of randomness in holding period
returns, even on relatively low-risk investment-grade commercial properties.A Random Walk Down Main Street  147
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1991:4 3.17 0.59 1.10 0.48 0.25
1993:1 0.13 1.74 1.66 0.07 0.83
1994:1 4.23 3.57 2.38 0.33 2.63
1995:1 1.17 0.48 0.12 0.51
1996:1 3.00 1.62 0.33 1.43
1997:1 2.65 0.24 1.21
1998:1 0.13 2.63 1.38
1999:1 1.33 1.33
2000:1 2.58 2.58
Average 1.07 0.95 1.12 0.29 0.14
Note: The sources are NCREIF and RERC Real Estate Report, various issues.
Exhibit 7 contains the corresponding set of HML return differentials for the
sixteen metropolitan areas. Here, there appears to be some weak evidence that a
strategy of investing in highly-ranked metropolitan areas would have outperformed
a strategy of investing in low-ranked MSAs. For example, the average HML return
differential, assuming a four-year holding period, was 0.53 percentage points. For
the twenty-four combinations of RERC survey results and holding period
assumptions, high-ranked portfolios outperformed low-ranked MSA portfolios by
0.30 percentage points, although there is a substantial amount of variation in the
twenty-three MSA HML differentials. Moreover, this positive 0.30 average return
differential has not been adjusted for the signiﬁcant transaction costs that would
be associated with quarterly adjustments of portfolio holdings based on RERC
survey results. Even a moderate estimate of such quarterly rebalancing costs would
eliminate the 30 basis point average outperformance of highly ranked portfolios.
RERC Survey Rankings are Backward Looking
The evidence presented thus far clearly shows that RERC’s rankings of investment
conditions are not predictive of future return performance at the aggregate MSA
or property level. In fact, further investigation reveals that RERC’s rankings are
backward looking. Consider the rankings and correlations displayed in Exhibit 8.
Once again, the ﬁrst column contains the property type rankings contained in the
ﬁrst quarter 1994 RERC survey. The second column contains the corresponding
NCREIF total returns for each property type over the previous two years. Property148  Ling











1991:4 1.22 0.95 0.41 0.18 0.69
1993:1 2.39 1.78 1.48 0.98 1.66
1994:1 1.56 1.11 0.78 0.11 0.89
1995:1 1.68 2.17 1.39 1.75
1996:1 0.79 0.71 0.02 0.51
1997:1 1.95 1.09 1.52
1998:1 0.15 0.34 0.25
1999:1 0.58 0.58
Average 0.53 0.18 0.10 0.30 0.30
Note: The sources are NCREIF and RERC Real Estate Report, various issues.
















Notes: The source is RERC Real Estate Report, Vol. 23, No. 1 and NCREIF.
aRated on a scale of 1  poor to 10  excellent.A Random Walk Down Main Street  149
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Exhibit 9  Correlation of RERC Investment Condition Rankings with NCREIF Returns in Prior Two Years
Forecast













Note: The sources are NCREIF and RERC Real Estate Report, various issues.
type investment condition rankings were positively related to NCREIF return
performance in the two years prior to the ﬁrst quarter of 1994. In fact, the
correlation was an astounding 0.67.
The complete set of two-year backward looking return correlations is contained
in Exhibit 9. The ﬁrst column reports the results for the nine property types. The
average correlation between current quarter investment desirability rankings and
NCREIF returns in the prior two years is 0.39. However, there is a great deal of
variation across the backward-looking correlations. For example, the correlation
of lagged two-year returns with the 1997 survey results was 0.67; the 1999:1
correlation was 0.18. Clearly, the degree to which RERC survey respondents
have based their performance expectations on prior years has varied considerably
over time. Moreover, the correlations reported in Exhibit 9 reveal a downward
drift in recent years, suggesting less anchoring of return expectations to prior
performance. The corresponding backward-looking two-year correlations for the
MSA samples have averaged 0.26. Both the property type and MSA correlations
are statistically signiﬁcant and strongly suggest that using aggregate RERC survey
results to determine current investment strategies has been akin to driving a car
by looking in the rear view mirror.
Why are survey respondents overweighting recent performance when constructing
their forecasts? The term used in the behavioral ﬁnance literature to describe the
behavior is ‘‘representativeness bias,’’ which is overweighting recent returns and150  Ling
underweighting long-term averages (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Baker, 2002;
and Barberis and Thaler, 2003).
 Interpretation and Implications of Results
The results reveal that investment strategies based on RERC’s quarterly investment
conditions rankings since 1991 would not have improved total return
performance—the criterion of prime importance to investors. The implications are
clear: investors should not focus on predictions of rents, property values, and
returns for the broad market segments followed by RERC.
Although it is not certain this result is generalizable, the burden of proof rests
with the producers of similar surveys and forecasts.7 Future tests of forecasting
ability, however, should be based on the ability of the forecast to improve
investors’ risk-adjusted returns. Jon Southard of Torto-Wheaton Research (TWR)
recently published a brief analysis of TWR’s ability to forecast MSA level rental
growth rates (Southard, 2003). Southard compared the average annualized growth
rates in rents from 1998 to 2002 in markets where TWR had forecast the most
rapid growth to markets where they had projected the slowest growth in rents.
According to Southard, buying properties in TWR’s ten top-ranked markets at the
beginning of 1998 would have resulted in average annual rent growth of 3.5%,
while selling assets in their 10 lowest-ranked markets would have allowed
investors to divest of assets with an average 0.70% growth rate. Southard claims
that following TWR’s rental growth projections ‘‘would result in improved returns
as the stronger rent growth feeds into stronger value growth.’’ This assertion is
troubling. The market’s consensus opinion on rent growth is presumably reﬂected
in the price of properties at the time of acquisition. This implies that buying
properties based on the expected magnitude of rent growth may not be consistent
with wealth maximization. Rather, investors should look for properties in markets
where they are more optimistic about future rent growth than the marginal buyer
and seller of such properties. That is, investors ‘‘win’’ when realized rental growth
rates are greater than expected by the marginal investor. Said differently, investors
could have purchased properties in all ten of the markets in which TWR predicted
strong rent growth. However, if realized growth in these markets was less than
expected by market participants when the assets where purchased, following
TWR’s strategy could have been wealth destroying.
What can be done to improve the usefulness of RERC’s surveys and projections?
First, the publication and discussion of property investment conditions aggregated
to the national level is of limited value. Knowing, for example, how ofﬁce property
investments are doing, or expected to do, on average, across the U.S. is
information that makes for interesting discussion; however, it is of no value to
investors considering the acquisition of ofﬁce properties located in speciﬁc local
markets.
What about RERC’s MSA-level forecasts? Commercial real estate analysts have
traditionally relied on MSA-level data to forecast the performance of propertiesA Random Walk Down Main Street  151
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located within their boundaries. This reliance on MSA-level data has been largely
driven by necessity, for more disaggregated data are only now becoming more
widely available. However, as demonstrated by Taylor, Rubin, and Lynford (2000),
submarket conditions are likely to be substantially and measurably more important
than MSA-level supply and demand conditions in explaining return performance.
This aggregation problem is exacerbated if all property types are compounded in
a ranking of MSA-level investment conditions.8
If investors should not expect to earn abnormal returns by trading on the national-
or MSA-level forecasts produced by RERC or other providers of similar forecasts,
where should investors focus their limited time and resources? Unfortunately,
index products akin to those that mimic the return on the S&P 500 and other
stock indices are not available to investors in unsecured commercial real estate
markets. The lack of a tradable index requires investors to purchase illiquid, whole
assets in local markets.
Until index products are developed for commercial real estate, a ‘‘top-down’’
diversiﬁcation oriented approach to individual asset selection is recommended.
Diversiﬁcation is a powerful tool for increasing the risk-adjusted return
performance of investor portfolios. Moreover, the results presented in this paper
strongly suggest that a ‘‘naı ¨ve’’ diversiﬁcation strategy of randomly allocating
investment capital across property types and MSAs is likely to be as effective,
and much less expensive, as an investment strategy that relies on return forecasts
aggregated to the MSA level. This is because, as discussed above, there is no
evidence that indicates managers and advisors can consistently pick winners and
losers among the MSAs and aggregate property types.9
An additional reason for following a naı ¨ve diversiﬁcation strategy is that return
variances and correlations across aggregate MSAs and property types appear to
be unstable over time. Thus, unlike in the broader capital markets where, say, a
low correlation between bond and stock returns, can be expected, the relation
between commercial property returns in Boston and returns in San Francisco, or
the returns on ofﬁce properties and the returns on apartment properties, cannot be
expected to remain relatively stable over time. In the absence of predictable returns
and/or stable return correlations, a simple naive diversiﬁcation strategy may be
preferable to a more expensive ‘‘strategic’’ allocation strategy.
In addition to pursuing an effective top–down diversiﬁcation strategy, investors
should focus on ‘‘deal’’ speciﬁcs, including the analysis of the immediate market
area, due diligence and underwriting, and negotiations. Although advisors and
managers can rarely consistently time acquisitions and dispositions across MSAs
and property types, most investors can beneﬁt from expert advice in identifying
and acquiring properties in local submarkets. Managers and advisors should spend
more time marketing their deal execution skills and less time promoting their
market forecasting abilities.
In summary, investors should focus on both ‘‘big picture’’ diversiﬁcation issues
and effective deal execution at the property level. The acquisition and analysis of152  Ling
MSA level or aggregate property type forecasts, such as those produced by RERC
and other ﬁrms, should be a casual hobby, not an activity upon which valuable
resources are consistently expended. In short, Cowles’ conclusions, ﬁrst published
in 1933 in an article titled ‘‘Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast,’’ apply to
commercial real estate markets today. A three-word abstract of Cowles’ article
concluded: ‘‘It is Doubtful.’’
 Endnotes
1 This quote from Bachelier (1900) is taken from Bernstein (1992), page 21.
2 See, for example, Stoesser and Hess (2000) and Han (1996).
3 Real Estate Report, summer 2002.
4 More information is available on the NCREIF website: www.ncreif.com.
5 This smoothing is thought to result from the tendency of appraisals to lag (i.e., only
partially adjust to) true value changes. The appraisal-based smoothing causes downward
biased estimates of total return volatility.
6 The metropolitan areas for which we had data for each survey are Atlanta, Boston,
Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, San
Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, and Washington D.C. Charlotte, Detroit,
Philadelphia, and Phoenix are also included in a number of the surveys.
7 Another survey of institutional investors that would be interesting to examine for its
forecasting ability is the Korpacz Real Estate Investor Survey, published by
PricewaterhouseCoopers. Each quarterly issue of the survey contains information on the
current and long-range perspectives of buyers’ strategies, including key value indicators
by market, marketing timing strategies, and expected growth rates. Upon request, PWC
would not provide any information on survey respondents other than to report that ‘‘there
are over 100 participants every quarter.’’ PricewaterhouseCoopers also publishes Real
Estate Value Cycles. This quarterly publication is said by PricewaterhouseCoopers to
provide ‘‘a clear and concise understanding of emerging trends in U.S. real estate value
cycles.’’ Future research could analyze the ability of these publications to predict future
return performance.
8 Interestingly, required pre-tax IRRs, also published quarterly by RERC, clearly reveal
that institutional investors and managers are largely unable to distinguish different levels
of risk across property types and, especially, MSAs. This is evident in the fact that, with
the possible exception of hotel properties, required, pre-tax IRRs vary remarkably little
across property types. Moreover, there is even less variation in required pre-tax IRRs
across MSAs. Thus, although RERC publishes investment condition rankings that display
a signiﬁcant amount of variation across property types and MSAs, the same survey
respondents report much less variation in required returns across these same property
types and MSAs.
9 Undoubtedly, some readers will have access to proprietary information that ‘‘proves’’
they (or their managers) have been able to consistently pick property type and/or MSA
‘‘winners.’’ We invite these individuals to make this information publicly available.A Random Walk Down Main Street  153
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